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The Third Wave 
Labour Unrest and Industrial 
Conflict in Canada: 1900-1967 
Stuart Jamieson 
The author investigates the strikes and labour unrest, and 
the associated widespread violence and illegality in the 
mid-sixties ; is this a new trend on the Canadian industrial 
relations scène ? It is seen as the crest of the third wave 
of Canadian labour unrest since 1900. The author supports 
the main recommendations in the Woods' Report that 
directly concern the question of labour unrest and indus-
trial conflict. 
The research project that I undertook for the Task Force on Labour 
Relations was a history of labour unrest and industrial conflict from 1900 
to 1966 inclusive. The central question that was kept in mind throughout 
the study was this : Does the wave of labour unrest and strikes during 
the mid-sixties, and the widespread violence and illegality that accom-
panied it, represent something new in the Canadian industrial relations 
scène, a product of new, rapidly changing and almost revolutionary 
conditions of the présent era ? Or was it merely the most récent mani-
festation of a type of behaviour pattern that for various reasons has 
occured on several occasions in previous décades ? This paper discusses 
the above questions. 
A boiled-down, over-simplified 
history of labor unrest in Canada 
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could be presented in a few sentences. It has occurred in three long 
"waves" or "cycles". Each of thèse started in what might be described 
as a period of comparative quiescence. With relatively minor intervening 
fluctuations, over protest and conflict then rose in magnitude over a 
period of two to three décades, reaching a peak, in scope and intensity, 
that was widely interpreted as constituting a crisis. This brought forth 
new government policies, followed by a new period of relative peace, 
then another mounting wave of conflict, and so on. 
Chronologically, the first long wave in Canada started in the mid-
1890's, reaching a climax in 1919. The second encompassed the period 
from the early 1920's to 1946-47. And the third wave covered the period 
from the late Forties to the mid-Sixties. Despite major transformations 
in the Canadian economy over this period of more than six décades, the 
three waves and peaks of industrial conflict had certain important charac-
teristics in common, in causal factors and in outward manifestations. This 
suggests that there are built-in characteristics or maladjustments, in the 
Canadian industrial relations system and in the broader économie, social 
and political environment, that create tension and conflict on a critical 
scale every génération or so. 
From the vantage point of history, therefore, the wave of strikes 
during 1965-66 could not be viewed as "unique", "unusual" or "unpre-
cedented". Indeed, relative to the much larger labor force and percentage 
of workers unionized since World War II, the incidence or impact of strikes 
was less serious in 1966 than in the previous peak years of 1919 and 
1946. 
One important respect in which the strike expérience in Canada 
during the mid 1960's was unusual or unique was that it represented a 
reversai of what appeared to be a long-term trend of world-wide propor-
tions, and it diverged sharply from the expérience of most other countries. 
Much of the following data is taken from the book by Ross and Hartman, 
entitled Changing Patterns of Industrial Conflict, which présents a com-
prehensive survey of strike expérience in fifteen countries. Thèse authors 
ïound that the overall "incidence" of strikes - as measured particularly by 
percentage of days employment lost - was by far highest in the United 
States. Canada ran a poor second, though far higher than in other coun-
tries. In ail countries, however, including the United States and Canada, the 
incidence of strikes, relative to the size of the work force employed and of 
total union membership, had declined markedly since World War II, and 
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this appeared to be a long-term trend. Canada, however, was unique in 
one important respect. Alone among the fifteen countries surveyed, includ-
ing the United States, the average duration of strikes in Canada had in-
creased since the war, and was substantially above that of the United States 
and other countries. 1 
The sharp upsurge of industrial conflict in Canada during the 1960's, 
reaching a peak in 1966, seemed to présent a second unique situation 
and to belie Ross and Hartman's findings regarding long-term trends. 
For the first time since the early years of World War II, the incidence 
of strikes in Canada exceeded that of the United States as measured by 
ail major indices ; Le., percentage of days employment lost, percentage 
of union members involved, and relative frequency, as well as average 
duration. 
Violence, illegality, and légal penalties arising out of labour disputes 
had likewise undergone a marked décline in most countries, including 
Canada, after World War II. Hère again, there appeared to be a unique 
and marked reversai in this country during the 1960's, when it seemed 
to be reverting to a pattern more characteristic of the 1930's and earlier. 
(However, in view of the events surrounding the gênerai strike in France 
last year, and the séries of large and violent strikes in Italy this year, 
Canada is no longer unique in this respect). 
On the subject of violence, illegality, and state suppression arising 
out of labor disputes, the results of my own and others' investigations on 
behalf of the Task Force, were surprising. Numerous past assertions 
that I've rashly made in print shall hâve to be revised. When comparing 
and contrasting ourselves with Americans, we Canadians tend to assert 
an image of a moderate, law-abiding people with almost a genius for 
rational compromise and peaceful seulement of disputes. In fact, Cana-
dians appear to hâve a record of violence and illegality in industrial 
relations second only to that of the United States. Ail told, from what 
records were available, there appear to hâve been at least 250., and 
probably far more, labor disputes in Canada since 1900 in which there 
1. Twelve years ago this author expressed the hypothesis, in print, without any 
attempt at testing or proving it, that the long average duration of strikes in 
Canada, and their greater duration in the postwar as compared to prewar pe-
riod, could be attributed to the rather cumbersome System of compulsory two-
stage conciliation of industrial disputes that was enforced by the fédéral and 
most provincial governments at that time. (See Stuart JAMIESON, Industrial 
Relations in Canada, Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1957, Chap. 4. 
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occurred violence, illegality, and use of force by the government in one 
form or another. Ninety or more of thèse happened during the décade 
1957-66 inclusive. They ranged from minor cases of arrests for 
"jostling" and "obstruction of police" on picket Unes, to major riots in 
which there occurred such phenomena as property damage, physical 
injury, deaths, and intervention by armed police or military forces. And, 
in view of her much smaller population and relatively, lesser frequency 
and size of strikes, every incident of violence in Canada should be mul-
tiplied by about 20 to 1 in comparing this country with the United 
States. 
Another related feature that stood out in the 1960's — aside from 
violence — was the number of cases of illégal wildcat strikes and picketing, 
and the frequency with which injunctions were issued and violated, with 
conséquent légal penalties. 
Some of the other findings from history were also surprising, insofar 
as they went counter to a number of hypothesis or pre-suppositions that 
I had when I began the study. Hère it will be necessary to rely heavily 
on a supporting statistical analysis by John Vanderkamp who worked with 
me on the historical survey. 2 
First. Over the period as a whole there has been no significant 
degree of corrélation between the waxing and waning of labour unrest 
and conflict on the one hand, with the ups-and-downs of the business 
cycle on the other. Only in the 1960's, and to a much lesser extent in 
the period 1900 to 1912, were économie expansion and inflation accom-
panied at ail closely by a mounting incidence of strikes. 
Second. For a number of obvious reasons one would hâve expected 
a close relationship of strike activity in Canada with that in the United 
States. Hère again, we found no significant corrélation, even when tested 
with one-and-two-year lags. 
Third. Industrial conflict in Canada has been primarily a régional 
phenomenon since the turn of the century, and the incidence of strikes 
has varied widely among différent régions, as well as différent industries, 
from year to year and décade to décade. Only on relatively rare occasions, 
under spécial combinations of circumstances, hâve there been nation-wide 
waves or patterns of industrial conflict. 
2. John VANDERKAMP, The Time Pattern of Industrial Conflict in Canada, 1901-
1966 (unpubl. mss. Task Force on Labour Relations, Ottawa, 1968.) 
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In between the major peak years mentioned earlier ; i.e., 1919,, 1946 
and 1966, there were a few minor peaks, in 1912, 1937, and 1943, that 
were nation-wide in character and scope. 
In the earlier décades, roughly up to the mid-thirties, the two "far-
out" régions, British Columbia and the Maritimes, accounted for a 
disproportionate share of strikes, and of violence, illegality and forceful 
repression. They were followed by Québec. The Prairie région stood out 
briefly in the immédiate postwar I period, when the Winnipeg General 
Strike dominated the industrial relations scène. Ontario was, by comparison, 
relatively quiescent. 
Among industries, coal-mining, concentrated in the Maritimes, 
Western Alberta, and British Columbia, accounted for a disproportionate 
number of strikes, strikers, and man-days lost from strikes up to and 
including World War II, as well as the more violent confrontations. From 
the late 1930's on, there has generally been an increased concentration 
of strikes, and of violence, illegality and government use of force, in 
Ontario and Québec, while British Columbia and particularly the Maritimes 
hâve become comparatively quiescent. This concentration was particularly 
pronounced during the mid-sixties. Correspondingly, in view of the pre-
vailing industrial structures of thèse provinces, the manufacturing, trans-
portation, construction and, more recently, public service industries hâve 
corne to dominate the strike picture. 
Explanation and Interprétation 
In attempting to explain thèse findings, it is necessary to focus first, 
on the industrial relations system rather than the broad social and political 
environment ; and secondly, on broad patterns of industrial conflict that 
appear to hâve been characteristic of the nation as a whole in récent 
décades, rather than on the problems of particular régions or eras. Of 
spécial interest to the Task Force Committee, as well as to a number of 
researchers like myself, hâve been the relatively high incidence of strikes 
and their high average duration, particularly since World War II ; the 
relative prevalence of violence and illegality ; and the correspondingly 
severe préventive or punitive measures taken by authorities at ail levels. 
A few of the explanations that follow are borrowed from Ross and 
Hartman's earlier mentioned work, but most of them were derived from 
the research study itself. 
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First. There has been the protracted and at times violent résistance 
of many influential employer groups in Canada to recognizing unions or 
engaging in meaningful collective bargaining. 
Second. Related to this, in both cause and effect, has been a long 
established tradition of union militancy which has been frustrated (or 
often exacerbated) by the fragmented and decentralized structure of the 
labour movement in Canada. As many critics hâve pointed out, there are 
and hâve been too many unions in this country, most of them too small 
to function effectively on behalf of their constituents. And in the aggregate 
they still represent a relatively minor fraction (less than one-third) of the 
paid labour force. 
Third. Deriving from thèse two outstanding features has been the 
prevalence of a highly fragmented (or segmented) and decentralized 
System of collective bargaining. Two thirds or more of ail agreements in 
Canada are and hâve long been negotiated between local unions and 
individual companies or plants. Many employers, even more than unions, 
hâve been unable or unwilling to organize effectively on a broader basis 
to engage in industry-wide or market-wide bargaining on even a local or 
régional, let alone nation-wide scale. 
Fourth. As a resuit of thèse weaknesses, unions and employers in 
Canada over the years hâve both corne to dépend on governments to an 
excessive degree, each party attempting to protect itself against the other. 
In early décades employers could in most cases rely on governments to 
défend their légal right to refuse récognition to unions or to protect their 
property, and their strikebreakers, in situations of overt conflict. In view 
of prevailing employer attitudes and policies in most industries, unions, 
to achieve even bare survival, came to dépend on governments to protect 
their rights to organize and to force employers to recognize and bargain 
with them. 
With unions having won thèse rights, employers in turn since World 
War II hâve corne to dépend increasingly on governments to pass new 
législation and on the courts to enforce new and more severe restrictions 
on unions to further protect their, that is employers', property and 
prérogatives. 
The resuit of ail this for Canada is an interesting paradox. In no 
country, with the possible exception of the United States, hâve employers 
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and unions proclaimed so vociferously the virtues of "free enterprise" 
and "free" collective bargaining respectively. Yet in no country, including 
the United States, hâve the two parties become so enmeshed in such a 
detailed, complex, and on the whole rigid web of légal régulations that 
sharply limit their freedom of action in such matters as unfair labor 
practices ; certification of unions ; collective bargaining, conciliation and 
arbitration procédures ; strikes, lockouts, picketing and boycotting ; is-
suance of injunctions ; and the like. Ail thèse in turn generate, particularly 
among union members, widespread frustration, disenchantment with the 
law, resort to illégal actions, and conséquent incurring of légal penalties. 
Fifth. Finally, there is and has been, overall, the unstable économie 
environment in which Canada's industrial relations system has had to 
operate. The Canadian economy, for a number of complex reasons, has 
been one that renders effective planning at the national or régional level 
exceedingly difficult to achieve. This was particularly apparent during the 
Dépression Thirties and in the postwar II period. The resuit has been, 
as compared to most Western countries, a relatively slow rate of increase 
in productivity and per capita real income, a highly unstable pattern of 
growth in output and employment, erratic movements in wage and price 
levels and, overall, a persistently high rate of unemployment in ail but 
a few peak boom periods. Such developments hâve tended to exacerbate 
labour unrest and industrial conflict. 
Task Force Conclusions and Recommendations 
In attempting to assess the conclusions of the Task Force in the 
light of my own research findings, I shall confine the discussion to main 
recommendations in the Report that directly concern the question of 
labour unrest and industrial conflict. I consider it an outstanding pièce 
of work — by far the best analytical survey of industrial relations in 
Canada, and agrée with ail but one or two relatively minor points among 
the recommendations it contains. 
First. The central thème and tone of the Report would seem to 
merit enthusiastic affirmation and re-affirmation. The authors express 
strong support for collective bargaining, and for the right to strike as an 
inséparable instrument of bargaining in ail but exceptional circumstances 
that would create serious public emergencies and hardships. 
The gênerai line of government policy recommended is to encourage 
and strengthen collective bargaining, while reducing the excessive number 
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of légal restrictions and interventions that tend to undermine its effecti-
veness. 
Second. One of the most important recommendations, in my view, 
is the proposai to broaden the powers of the Labor Relations Board (to 
be re-named the Industrial Relations Board), to enable it to consolidate 
existing bargaining units and to order multi-union, multi-employer and 
industry-wide bargaining for spécifie purposes. Potentially, at least, such 
a measure could go far towards overcoming the overly segmented pattern 
of bargaining and to induce unions and employers to improve and 
consolidate the fragmented structure of their organizations that has pre-
vailed hitherto. 
Third. By the same token, the proposai to staff the Industrial 
Relations Board entirely with neutral public members, in place of union 
and employer représentatives and a neutral chairman, seems to make 
sensé. The présent composition of such boards is one that gives légal power 
to vested interests on both sides to perpetuate the existing structure, with 
ail its limitations. 
Fourth. As regards the question of disputes settlement, it's difficult 
to disagree with the recommendations for dismantling the cumbersome 
two-stage procédure of compulsory conciliation that applies under fédéral 
législation, and to introduce a greater measure of flexibility. 
The principle of appointing ad hoc tri-partite boards to hold hearings 
and make recommendations for settling disputes, and prohibiting strikes 
or lockouts while the boards are sitting, in Canada dates back to the early 
years of this century. Its long record is one in which it would be difficult 
to establish that the principle has had any great measure of success in 
practice. Indeed, a case could be made for the contention that it tended 
to delay and discourage the émergence of mature collective bargaining 
relations between unions and employers. And the argument has been 
presented elsewhere that the prevalence of compulsory two-stage conci-
liation during the latter 1940's and throughout the 1950's contributed 
in a major way to the unusually long average duration of strikes in this 
country.3 Most provincial governments hâve been moving somewhat in 
the direction recommended by the Task Force — that is, to limit com-
pulsory intervention to that of the Conciliation Officer, and to leave the 
way open thereafter to the use of a variety of alternative measures for 
attempting to settle disputes and terminate strikes. In this way, dispute 
3. JAMIESON, op. cit. 
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seulement procédures can be to some degree "tailor made" to suit the 
varying issues and circumstances faced in différent industries. 
I differ, however, with the Task Force in its proposai to retain the 
principle of compulsory intervention by Conciliation Officers at the initial 
stage. 
(To borrow the late Chief Justice Hughes' misleading observation 
about peaceful picketing, one might say that "Compulsory Conciliation" 
is a basic contradiction in terms, like "honest thievery" or "chaste vul-
garity"). If collective bargaining is to be given the utmost encourage-
ment, it seems to me that conciliation should at ail times be voluntary. 
And, where it's conducted under officiai auspices, the government should 
retain the option as to whether or not to invoke it, even of both parties 
jointly request the service. The gouvernment, in other words, should 
confine its interventions in otherwise peaceful disputes only to those in 
which an important public interest is involved, though not necessarily to 
the degree of being in the category of a "public emergency." 
Fifth. Various Task Force recommendations for removing certain 
irritating restrictions on strikes, lockouts, picketing and boycotting would 
also seem to merit strong support. Among thèse are : intérim certification 
for unions seeking jurisdiction over workers employed in jobs of short 
duration ; automatic dues check-offs for ail employées under certified 
union jurisdiction ; the right to strike or lockout at the terminal date of 
agreements, rather than of dispute seulement procédures that often extend 
far beyond that ; a mandatory, six-months notice from employers to the 
government, and to unions, of technological changes that would lead to 
permanent displacement of workers ; the right to negotiate and engage in 
strike action over any such technological changes that may be introduced 
in a bargaining unit while an agreement is in force ; the right of ail 
employées to refuse to cross picket Unes in support of légal strikes ; legali-
zation of union picketing of employers buying from or selling to other 
employers involved in strikes or lockouts ; and vesting in the Industrial 
Relations Board the enforcement of picketing régulations as they apply 
to collective bargaining policy. This would eliminate applications to 
courts for injunctions, except for cases involving the criminal law. I 
would add another recommendation, which the Task Force rejected in 
its Report; namely, the legalization of "informational" picketing by 
unions of non-union employers. 
This group of recommendations would seem to offer the possibility, 
if implemented, of leading to several improvements in the climate of labor 
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relations in this country. Conceivably, they might lead to an increased 
number of disputes and strikes, though this seems unlikely if other major 
recommendations were also implemented, such as broadening the scope 
of bargaining. In any case, as against this possibility, it seems likely that 
the average duration of strikes and lockouts, and ultimately their aggre-
gate costs, would also be reduced. Such measures, furthermore, are 
designed to alleviate or reduce in number the types of situations that 
generate widespread and intense frustration and unrest, and consequently 
wildcat strikes and other illégal activities, among large groups of workers. 
And, by reducing the frequency with which the courts become involved 
in labour disputes, thèse measures should inculcate a greater respect for 
the law than has existed in union circles to date. 
Sixth. Finally, as suggested earlier in this paper, the relatively 
extrême instability of Canada's economy hitherto, with bursts of infla-
tionary expansion followed by periods of stagnation and severe unemploy-
ment, has been one of the most important factors underlying widespread 
labour unrest and conflict. While having implications that go far beyond 
those of industrial relations in the narrower or more spécifie sensé of the 
term, the Task Force Report stresses the need for broad measures of 
économie planning and research to achieve a more stable and sustained 
pattern of économie growth. Its major spécifie recommendation in this 
regard is the establishment of an Incomes and Costs Research Board as 
a research and advisory agency. The Fédéral Government has already 
taken steps to establish such an agency having a différent title, under the 
Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs. It appears to differ only 
in relatively minor détail from that envisaged by the Task Force. 
No attempt has been made in this paper to analyse a number of 
other recommendations of the Task Force report. Some of thèse are not 
directly relevant to the question of labour unrest and industrial conflict 
as such, and are concerned more with issues of administrative efficiency, 
fairness and equity, protection of individual rights, and the like. Such, 
for instance, are the proposais for a bill of rights for union members ; 
transfer of union hiring halls to the Manpower Department ; and merging 
of the Public Service Staff Relations Board with the proposed new Re-
lations Board. 
On some other major proposais, such as a représentative Canadian 
Industrial Relations Council to deal with disputes that présent a major 
threat to the public welfare, I've suspended judgment due to inability to 
assess its probable effects on the level or intensity of conflict. 
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LES CONFLITS OUVRIERS AU CANADA : 1900-1967 
Notre exposé porte sur l'histoire canadienne des conflits ouvriers et industriels 
de 1900 à 1966. La question centrale que nous nous posons est la suivante : la 
vague de grèves et d'agitation des travailleurs ainsi que la violence et les procédés 
illégaux, représentent-ils un phénomène nouveau sur la scène canadienne en rela-
tions industrielles, ou s'agit-il d'une simple manifestation d'un modèle de comporte-
ment qui s'est répété plusieurs fois au cours des dernières décennies. 
Un retour dans le passé nous fait voir la possibilité d'analyser l'agitation ou-
vrière en trois cycles. Chacune des périodes commence par un temps de calme 
relatif, suivi de troubles mineurs. Une protestation ouverte accompagnée de conflits 
se développe sur une période de vingt à trente ans atteint son apogée d'étendue et 
d'intensité en un phénomène que l'on peut qualifier de crise. De nouvelles politiques 
gouvernementales en résultent, puis une paix relative ; et le cycle recommence. 
Le premier cycle commença au Canada vers 1895, et atteignit son apogée en 
1919. Le deuxième engloba les années de 1920 à 1946-47. La troisième séquence 
couvrit la période débutant vers la fin des années '40 jusqu'au milieu des années '60. 
Ce vol d'oiseau historique nous permet d'affirmer que l'agitation des années 1965-
1966 n'est pas unique ni sans précédent : l'impact et les effets des grèves des années 
'60 furent proportionnellement moins sévères qu'en 1911 et 1946. 
Le modèle des grèves au Canada des années '60 avait ceci d'inhabituel qu'il in-
versait une tendance mondiale à long terme et qu'il divergeait fortement de l'expé-
rience vécue dans d'autres pays : depuis la guerre, la durée moyenne des grèves au 
Canada a augmenté contrairement à ce qui s'est produit à travers le monde. Pour 
la première fois depuis le début des années '40, les indices les plus importants dé-
notent que l'incidence des grèves au Canada fut plus élevée qu'aux États-Unis. 
La violence, l'illégalité et les sanction légales dues aux conflits de travail avaient 
diminués dans la plupart des pays, et au Canada, après la deuxième guerre mondiale. 
Mais dans les années '60, cette tendance s'est renversé fortement au Canada. Au 
fait, les Canadiens semblent détenir un record de violence et d'activités illégales en 
relations industrielles, et arrivent deuxième après les États-Unis. Un autre aspect 
des années '60 est le nombre de grèves sauvages et de piquetages illégaux, la fré-
quence des injonctions émises et violées, et le nombre des sanctions légales subsé-
quentes. Soulignons aussi les faits historiques suivants : 
1 ) Il n'existe pas un degré de corrélation significatif entre les variations d'agita-
tion ouvrière et le mouvement du cycle des affaires. 
2) Il n'y a pas de corrélation positive entre le schème des grèves américaines 
et celui des grèves canadiennes. 
3) Le conflit industriel au Canada a été un phénomène plutôt régional que 
national. 
Explication et interprétation. 
1) Nous avons eu de la part de beaucoup de groupes d'employeurs influents 
au Canada une résistance prolongée et parfois violente à reconnaître les syndicats 
ou à s'engager dans une négociation collective valable. 
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2) En plus, une tradition longuement établie de lutte syndicale s'est vue con-
tinuellement frustrée et souvent exacerbée par la structure fragmentée et décentra-
lisée du mouvement ouvrier canadien. 
3) Un système hautement fragmenté et décentralisé de négociation collective 
rend difficile la négociation sur un pallier industriel complet, ou sur le marché com-
plet d'un produit, en faveur de niveaux locaux ou régionaux. 
4) Les syndicats et les employeurs au Canada ont pris l'habitude de dépendre 
d'une façon exagérée du gouvernement pour qu'il les protège les uns des autres. 
Aujourd'hui les deux parties sont tellement emmêlées dans un système de règlements 
complexes qu'elles en voient leur liberté d'action limitée. La conséquence génère 
particulièrement parmi les membres des syndicats une frustration généralisée, un 
désenchantement face à la loi, un recours à l'illégalité, et des sanctions légales 
subséquentes. 
5) Le climat économique instable du Canada rend la planification au niveau 
national et régional difficile. Il en a résulté un taux relativement bas d'accroissement 
de la productivité et du revenu réel per capita, une structure très instable de crois-
sance de la production et des emplois, des mouvements irréguliers du niveau des 
prix et des salaires, et un taux de chômage qui persiste. 
Nous considérons le rapport de l'Équipe spécialisée comme étant une analyse 
fort valable des relations industrielles au Canada, et sommes d'accord avec la pres-
que totalité de ses recommandations. 
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